

Online appendix for

**“Who commits to regional human rights treaties?
Reputational benefits, sovereignty costs, and regional dynamics.”**

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Table A1: Data sources

Variable	Format	Description and source
Change in government	Dummy 1/0	Own coding based on the Archigos dataset of political leaders. Coded as “1” for every year in which a new “leader-spell” according to Archigos has started. Source: Archigos dataset version 4.1, February 2016 http://ksgleditsch.com/archigos.html , Goemans et al. 2009
Common Law	Dummy 1/0	Coded as “1” for countries with a British / Common Law legal heritage, such as former British colonies. Source: La Porta et al. 1999
Democracy score	Scale (0-10; higher is more democratic)	“Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables are averaged into fh_polity2. The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on the average Freedom House measure.” Source: QoG Standard 2020 (Variable fh_ipolity2)
Democracy score, alternative specification	Scale (0-10, higher is more democratic)	“Electoral democracy index. Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?” Source: QoG Standard 2020 (Variable vdem_polyarchy) Original source: V-Dem (Variable v2x_polyarchy) Note: Original scale (0-1) multiplied by ten to match the scaling of the other democracy variable.
Democratization	Dummy 1/0	Coded as “1” when the democracy score increased by 2.0 or more in the current or either of the two previous years.
Democratization, alternative specification	Dummy 1/0	Coded as “1” when the democracy score (alternative specification) increased by at least 0.1 on the original scale in the current or either of the two previous years.
GDP	Continuous	“Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2010 official exchange rates.” Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD Note: Transformed into the natural logarithm.
High sovereignty cost	Dummy 1/0	Coded as “1” when a regional treaty imposes relatively high sovereignty costs by creating an enforcement mechanism (human rights court) Source: Own research of treaty contents.

Internal armed conflict	Dummy 1/0	<p>“Number of internal armed conflicts per country in a given year. Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.”</p> <p>Source: QoG Standard 2020 (Variable ucdp_type3)</p> <p>Original source: UCDP/PRIO</p> <p>Note: Recoded from a count (number of parallel conflicts) to a dummy variable.</p>
Neighborhood ratification	Continuous	<p>Number of countries from the same sub-region as the country under investigation that had ratified the respective treaty prior to the current year. (Set to 0 for the first year each treaty is available to ratify.)</p> <p>Source: Own calculation using the sub-regions specified in the World Bank WDI</p>
UN meeting	Dummy 1/0	<p>Coded as “1” when a United Nations conference on the topic of the regional treaty has taken place in the current or either of the two previous years.</p> <p>Source: Own research on dates of UN conferences based on Wikipedia and web research.</p>

Table A2: Summary statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variable</i>					
Ratification	10163	0.045	0.207	0	1
<i>Independent variables</i>					
Democracy score	9347	6.255	3.186	0.25	10
Democratization	9113	0.043	0.202	0	1
Neighborhood ratification	10163	2.955	3.771	0	16
High sovereignty costs	10163	0.224	0.417	0	1
GDP (USD, logged)	9161	22.904	2.334	18.621	30.513
Common law	9993	0.477	0.500	0	1
Change in government	9136	0.229	0.420	0	1
UN event	10163	0.014	0.118	0	1
Internal armed conflict	9993	0.100	0.301	0	1

Table A3: Extended model for the OAS without the 1994 treaty on women's rights

Democracy	1.188** (0.065)
Democratization	2.382** (0.673)
Neighborhood	1.127*** (0.041)
High cost	1.222 (0.210)
GDP (USD, logged)	1.032 (0.055)
Common law	0.030*** (0.017)
Change in government	1.506* (0.263)
UN event	7.827 (9.355)
Internal armed conflict	1.273 (0.327)
No. of countries	34
No. of treaties	7
Time at risk / observations	4126
Ratifications	125
BIC	1109.377

Note: Shaded cells indicate results that differ substantially from the models reported in the main text (in effect size and/or statistical significance).

Table A4: Models with dummy variables for each country or treaty

	Dummy variable for each country				Dummy variable for each treaty			
	Main model		Extended model		Main model		Extended model	
	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU
Democracy					1.299*** (0.067)	1.016 (0.031)	1.302*** (0.071)	1.011 (0.031)
Democratization					2.047** (0.510)	0.621 (0.211)	1.877* (0.481)	0.553 (0.186)
Neighborhood	1.362*** (0.054)	1.144*** (0.029)	1.280*** (0.053)	1.144*** (0.030)	1.069* (0.035)	1.065** (0.025)	1.063 (0.036)	1.073** (0.026)
High cost	1.017 (0.253)	0.379*** (0.072)	1.046 (0.265)	0.379*** (0.072)				
GDP (USD, logged)					0.995 (0.041)	1.117** (0.045)	0.989 (0.042)	1.133** (0.048)
Common law					0.048*** (0.015)	1.005 (0.172)	0.051*** (0.016)	1.009 (0.173)
Change in government							1.321 (0.231)	0.887 (0.135)
UN event			4.547*** (1.336)	1.001 (1.050)				
Internal armed conflict							1.460 (0.380)	0.905 (0.256)
	<i>(Coefficients for country dummies omitted.)</i>				<i>(Coefficients for treaty dummies omitted.)</i>			
No. of countries	34	54	34	54	34	52	34	51
No. of treaties	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Time at risk	5003	4990	5003	4990	4615	3986	4273	3638
Ratifications	158	298	158	298	157	259	157	253
BIC	1706.133	3534.220	1689.167	3542.735	1433.302	2704.667	1436.614	2634.781

Note: Models with treaty-level (country-level) dummy variables exclude treaty-level (country-level) explanatory variables. Shaded cells indicate results that differ substantially from the models reported in the main text (in effect size and/or statistical significance).

Table A5: Models with shared frailty at the country or the treaty level

	Shared frailty – by country				Shared frailty – by treaty			
	Main model		Extended model		Main model		Extended model	
	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU
Democracy	1.175** (0.060)	1.006 (0.029)	1.193** (0.065)	1.011 (0.029)	1.285*** (0.065)	1.012 (0.026)	1.281*** (0.069)	1.010 (0.026)
Democratization	2.058** (0.510)	0.584 (0.219)	2.072** (0.522)	0.507 (0.203)	2.062** (0.510)	0.622 (0.229)	1.927** (0.489)	0.553 (0.219)
Neighborhood	1.235*** (0.040)	1.105*** (0.024)	1.146*** (0.038)	1.116*** (0.025)	1.086* (0.035)	1.071*** (0.019)	1.085* (0.036)	1.082*** (0.020)
High cost	1.540 (0.404)	0.361*** (0.069)	1.252 (0.334)	0.393*** (0.077)	0.754 (0.663)	0.327*** (0.103)	0.829 (0.578)	0.354** (0.113)
GDP (USD, logged)	0.997 (0.053)	1.143* (0.062)	0.999 (0.047)	1.171** (0.066)	0.999 (0.041)	1.117** (0.046)	0.995 (0.043)	1.136** (0.049)
Common law	0.084*** (0.027)	0.933 (0.181)	0.080*** (0.025)	0.925 (0.182)	0.052*** (0.016)	1.005 (0.139)	0.057*** (0.018)	1.007 (0.141)
Change in government			1.318 (0.228)	0.847 (0.152)			1.309 (0.228)	0.880 (0.155)
UN event			6.132*** (1.776)	0.857 (0.886)			2.550* (1.083)	0.415 (0.428)
Internal armed conflict			1.211 (0.325)	1.081 (0.224)			1.392 (0.361)	0.923 (0.171)
No. of countries	34	52	34	51	34	52	34	51
No. of treaties	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Time at risk	4615	3986	4273	3638	4615	3986	4273	3638
Ratifications	157	259	157	253	157	259	157	253
BIC	1461.084	2671.904	1437.110	2609.383	1412.652	2674.804	1421.069	2611.931

Note: Shaded cells indicate results that differ from the models reported in the main text (in effect size and/or statistical significance).

Table A6: Models with alternative democracy and democratization variables

	Main model		Extended model	
	OAS	OAU/AU	OAS	OAU/AU
Democracy (<i>alt. spec.</i>)	1.124* (0.066)	1.031 (0.036)	1.143* (0.063)	1.035 (0.039)
Democratization (<i>alt. spec.</i>)	1.992* (0.560)	1.030 (0.239)	1.814* (0.522)	0.998 (0.236)
Neighborhood	1.168*** (0.041)	1.087*** (0.025)	1.124** (0.041)	1.097*** (0.026)
High cost	1.125 (0.171)	0.377*** (0.063)	1.016 (0.179)	0.415*** (0.070)
GDP (USD, logged)	1.002 (0.068)	1.122** (0.042)	0.987 (0.059)	1.138** (0.047)
Common law	0.115*** (0.053)	0.939 (0.148)	0.105*** (0.046)	0.947 (0.152)
Change in government			1.531** (0.233)	0.833 (0.126)
UN event			4.486*** (1.323)	0.794 (0.829)
Internal armed conflict			1.322 (0.269)	1.018 (0.261)
No. of countries	26	52	26	51
No. of treaties	8	8	8	8
Time at risk	3216	4223	3036	3875
Ratifications	148	273	148	267
BIC	1350.514	2882.297	1332.096	2821.321

Note: The alternative democracy and democratization variables (see Table A1) lead to better coverage of the early years (1969-1972). However, these indicators are unavailable for a number of smaller states. Compare the number of countries and ratifications indicated below each model.

Table A7: Negative binomial regression of ratifications per treaty

OAU/AU dummy	0.818*** (0.156)
High cost	0.148 (0.335)
OAU/AU * high cost	-1.106* (0.647)
Constant	2.760*** (0.647)
Observations	16
BIC	126.353

Note: One of the anonymous reviewers suggested a count poisson regression of the number of ratifiers per treaty per year to probe the effect of treaty-related sovereignty costs. Unfortunately, this would leave us without any covariates that change over time, since organization and sovereignty costs are constant for each treaty. Moreover, the number of new ratifications per year is limited by the fact that each organization has a fixed number of member states, which puts a ceiling on the count variable that seems difficult to model. To avoid these issues, we have fit a negative binomial regression with the cumulative count of ratifications for each treaty (n=16). Here, the interaction between the African Union and treaty-specific sovereignty costs is negative and statistically significant, supporting the results of our main model. (Negative binomial regression is used due to overdispersion of the dependent variable. The results from the poisson regression are virtually identical.)